THE PRIME Minister has called for yet another review of the 260.5 meter high Tehri dam in the Garhwal hills, which is located in a highly active seismic zone. Sunderlal Bahuguna has sat on several long fasts asking the Government to re-think on the dam,
which, if a quake strikes and the dam cracks, might lead to a disaster which will be many times more in magnitude than the tragedy in Gujarat.
Similarly, there have been doubts raised by experts on the feasibility of the Sardar Sarovar dam in Gujarat, now that it is confirmed that the seismic zone here is prone to tremors and quakes of high intensity. That is why a re-think on this mega-project
involving so many dams is a rational demand, and not a cranky obsession resurrected by ‘crazed eco-terrorists’, as we are made out to be.
Hard facts
Consider these facts: The Interstate Tribunal set up for resolving the interstate dispute over the Narmada waters and the proposed project, worked from 1969 to 1979. Before that, Jawaharlal Nehru had inaugurated not Sardar Sarovar but a much smaller
project in Gujarat. The Tribunal didn’t go in for fresh/primary impact assessments but based its decision (during a 10-year long process) on the submissions (of facts, views, problems) made by the state governments. Both the Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh
governments had opposed the idea on the ground that it is a costly project with meagre benefits. The decision of the Tribunal was further subject to approval by the Ministry of Environment and Planning Commission.
The environmental clearance by the former, granted in 1987 (eight years after the Tribunal) under the River Valley Project Guidelines and the Environmental Protection Act of 1986, could not become a final decision since the planning related to
rehabilitation and the assessment/mitigation/ compensation of environmental impacts was not completed. Time bound conditions were not complied with. For instance, the Rehabilitation Master Plan was not prepared by December 1989 and hence, the ministry
declared the clearance as having lapsed, asking the Ministry of Water Resources to seek a fresh okay certificate.
Implications
What the minority judgment by Justice Bharucha of the Supreme Court points out is that no fresh clearance proving compliance has been sought by the dam-builders till this date. This may be shocking but a fact that was apparently proved in the Supreme
Court.
A serious implication is that the Master Plan for rehabilitation with details of land to be allotted to the project affected is not yet ready. Where will these families go?
Take a look at the scale of the problem. Not less than 43,500 tribals, farmers, fishworkers’ and small traders’ will be affected by the reservoir. (The length of the reservoir is like the distance between Delhi and Agra or Bombay and Valsad.) Only 25 per
cent of these people could be relocated over the last 20 years since the Tribunal award. Does it not prove that when it comes to the poorest of the poor, the Government simply does not care?
Indeed, there has never been any political will or urgency to prepare a complete plan, while the governments, especially that of Gujarat, kept boasting of land for land and other provisions in the policy.
The dam work had to be slowed down or stayed (by the Court) from 1995 till 1999 due to this factor. Today, the dam-height reached is 90 metres; the final height approved by the Tribunal is 138.68 mts. Justice Kirpal’s judgment permitted further
construction from 88 to 90 metres on the condition that the affected should be resettled as per the Tribunal’s recommendations by December 31, 2000. It is now a fact accepted by the authorities and state governments that this just could not be done,
thereby failing to comply with both the Tribunal Award and the Supreme Court judgment. Why?
Massive displacement
There is no land. The Gujarat government is playing a dirty trick. There are hundreds of families in villages on the river bank which the government refuses to take cognisance of. Both Gujarat and Maharashtra governments refuse to acknowledge that all
those ‘relocated’ are not actually ‘rehabilitated’.
Look at the scale of uprootment. At least 33,000 families as per official surveys, (40,000 according to our field surveys), are still in the reservoir-affected area in Madhya Pradesh. They need thousands of hectares of agricultural land, even if policy
inadequacies are not corrected. And policies don’t offer anything for the non-agriculturists. There are almost equivalent number of families (40,000) to be affected by the project-related work. They have been left out of the policy.
They have rights too
All those who lose their resources have a right to participate in the planning process and to raise questions not only about fair compensation, but also for a share in the benefits of the project. A farmer who loses four out of five acres of land-holding
to the reservoir should be treated at equal par with a farmer who loses in the same proportion. There are 23,500 families losing more than 25 per cent of their land for the canal network; such losers in the reservoir area are entitled for land for land,
but these people have been left out. Surely, no amount of cash compensation can do justice to a losing farmer, especially the small, marginal or tribal cultivators.
The questions related to Sardar Sarovar and big dams go beyond displacement. There are pro-dam lobbies who glorify large projects. Do they know that no big dam was evaluated till the World Commission on Dams got a study of Indian dams done by consultants
last year? As a member of the WCD, I had access to data on hundreds of dams and research work on the economic, social and environmental impact as well as alternatives to big dams. The report brings out vividly not just the displacement factor or the
serious environmental impacts which are not assessed, but also the issue of bad economics. The fact is that planned benefits are not actualised in many such projects and costs are not recovered.
The Bhakra or Indira (Rajasthan) canal projects too point out large scale water-logging and salinisation problems. The alternatives to big dams in water management are more obvious than in the energy sector. A decentralised water harvesting system is a
possible alternative. In Bhakra too, most of the growth in production was through ground water which could be obtained through alternatives which are more acceptable today than at that time.
A few years after his famous statement on big dams as ‘modern temples of India’, Nehru was quick to understand the paradox: he referred to the “disease of gigantism”. The SSP benefits are not going to flow to people on the river banks who are the victims.
A small number may be resettled in the command area of the project, but most people will be totally uprooted.
With 94,000 MW of power generation capacity attained, we still have 60 per cent of rural households unelectrified. Water which flows to urban-industrial centres through big dams is used at the rate of 300-400 litres per capita/per day. Only five per cent
of the population use 85 per cent water, especially in big cities.
The issue is not just a dam but how to manage our resources. We are raising this question because the visions of the planners and our rulers are blurred with the idea of ‘profit’ from big dams at the cost of a silent majority. We all need to learn the
value of a river and living human communities; that they can’t be uprooted and so easily ‘replanted’ into a better life.
